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Insomnia is a prevalent disabling chronic disorder. The aim of this paper is fourfold: (a) to
review evidence suggesting that dysfunctional forms of cognitive control, such as thought
suppression, worry, rumination, and imagery control, are associated with sleep distur-
bance; (b) to review a new budding ﬁeld of scientiﬁc investigation – the role of dysfunctional
affect control in sleep disturbance, such as problems with down-regulating negative and
positive affective states; (c) to review evidence that sleep disturbance can impair next-
day affect control; and (d) to outline, on the basis of the reviewed evidence, how the
repetitive-thought literature and the affective science literature can be combined to further
understanding of, and intervention for, insomnia.
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INTRODUCTION
Insomnia is a prevalent disorder,withbetween4 and22%of people
reporting chronic insomnia (Ancoli-Israel and Roth, 1999; Cheva-
lier et al., 1999; Roth et al., 2011). The consequences of insomnia
include complaints of impaired concentration and memory, ele-
vated risk of accidents, more frequent use of medical services,
and augmented work absenteeism (Ohayon et al., 1997; Roth and
Ancoli-Israel, 1999). Furthermore, there is evidence that insomnia
signiﬁcantly heightens the risk of subsequently developing another
psychiatric disorder, particularly an anxiety disorder, depression,
or a substance-related disorder (Taylor et al., 2005; Johnson et al.,
2006; Brower and Perron, 2010). Not surprisingly then, insom-
nia is regarded as a serious public health problem, with the direct
and indirect costs associated with it in the United States estimated
at between US$30 and 35 billion annually (Chilcott and Shapiro,
1996).
Over the last decades, behavioral and cognitive approaches have
led to signiﬁcant advances in the etiology and treatment of this
disorder (e.g., Harvey et al., 2005; Bootzin and Epstein, 2011).
Cognitively inspired accounts of insomnia assume that mental
hyperarousal (e.g., Harvey, 2002) or problems with mental de-
arousal (e.g.,Espie,2002) play a key role in acute and chronic forms
of this disorder. In support of such a role, it has been found that
poor sleepers are cognitivelymore aroused at bedtime thannormal
sleepers are (e.g.,Robertson et al., 2007) and that poor sleepers per-
ceive their“racing mind”as causally related to their sleep problems
(e.g.,Lichstein andRosenthal,1980).Cognitive accounts of insom-
nia also generally assume that inadequate emotional processing
during the day will result in a surge of affect-laden concerns dur-
ing the presleep period, thereby fueling excessive negatively toned
cognitive activity (e.g., Espie, 2002;Harvey, 2002).However, as will
be reviewed in more detail below, empirical research into affective
aspects of sleep-interfering arousal is still in its early stages.
A growing line of research suggests that poor sleepers typically
have difﬁculties relinquishing control when trying to fall asleep
(Espie et al., 2006). Speciﬁcally, in the face of unwanted mental
activity at bedtime, which can take the form of verbal thought or
visual imagery (Harvey, 2000), poor sleepers tend to rely on dys-
functional control strategies that maintain cognitive and affective
arousal instead of helping them to wind down (Harvey, 2002). In
this article, we will ﬁrst review evidence suggesting that dysfunc-
tional forms of cognitive control, such as thought suppression,
worry, rumination, and imagery control, are associated with sleep
disturbance. We will then review more recent research suggesting
that dysfunctional affect control, such as problems with down-
regulating negative and positive affective states, are also related
to sleep disturbance. Moreover, we will review research indicating
that sleep disturbance, in turn, can impair next-day affect con-
trol. Finally, we will outline how theoretical principles from the
repetitive-thought literature could advance the study of cognitive
control in insomnia, while principles and tools from the affec-
tive science literature could foster the study of affective control in
insomnia.Aswill emerge fromour analysis, a better understanding
of the intricate interplay between cognitive and affective control
could lead to the development of new intervention techniques that
facilitate the transition to sleep.
EXPLORATIONS OF THE ROLE OF COGNITIVE CONTROL IN
INSOMNIA
EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES ON THE ROLE OF THOUGHT SUPPRESSION IN
INSOMNIA
Given that poor sleepers typically perceive their racing mind as
causally related to their problems with sleep (e.g., Lichstein and
Rosenthal, 1980), it seems inevitable that these individuals will
do something in an attempt to prevent, modify, or suppress the
thoughts that they perceive to be interfering with their sleep
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(Harvey, 2002). In this section, we will review evidence suggest-
ing that ironic effects of thought suppression (e.g., Wegner, 1989;
Najmi and Wegner, 2008) may be involved in the etiology and
persistence of unwanted intrusive thoughts in insomnia.
Wegner (1994) accounted for the counterproductive effects
of thought suppression by suggesting that the level of mental
control enjoyed by an individual at any one time is a function
of the joint action of a monitoring and an operating process.
Termed the ironic process theory, it maintains that attempts to
suppress involve (a) a controlled operating process that directs
attention toward a distracter, that is, a thought other than the
unwanted one; and (b) an automatic monitoring process that
searches for failures to achieve the desired state and that, if nec-
essary, renews the ﬁrst process. In many circumstances, these
interrelated processes work in tandem to successfully achieve sup-
pression. However, there are a number of situations in which
the balance is undermined, resulting in the unwanted thought
intruding into consciousness. The “rebound” of the suppressed
thought is explained by the fact that if the controlled distracter
search is voluntarily relinquished or disabled by other resource-
demanding tasks, the automatic and therefore less resource-
dependent monitoring lingers on, thereby enhancing the acces-
sibility of the target thought (e.g., Najmi and Wegner, 2008). A
series of studies highlight the importance of this theory to sleep
and insomnia.
Harvey (2003) instructed individuals with insomnia and
good sleepers either to suppress or to not suppress one
issue/problem/thought while trying to get to sleep. On the night
of the study, the participants who were told to suppress reported
that they took longer to fall asleep and rated their sleep qual-
ity as poorer compared with participants given non-suppression
instructions. This ﬁnding suggests that attempting to suppress
a thought adversely affects both (a) self-reported sleep-onset
latency and (b) sleep quality. The effect was detected for both
the good sleepers and the patients with insomnia. Contrary to
previous work (Wegner, 1989), there was no paradoxical increase
in the frequency of the suppressed thought. However, it should
be noted that the expected rebound of the suppressed thought
might have occurred after sleep onset, which would have pre-
cluded it from emerging in the participants’ reports about the
presleep period. To test this hypothesis, Schmidt and Gendolla
(2008) used an experimental design involving forced awakenings
in a sleep laboratory. Half of the participants were instructed to
suppress a target thought, whereas the other half freely thought of
anything at all. Results revealed a reversal of target thought fre-
quency at sleep onset: participants instructed to suppress reported
fewer target thoughts than did controls before falling asleep, but
more target thoughts afterward. In a related vein, three studies
have found a suppression-induced increase of a target thought
in dream mentation, especially if the target thought is laden
with affect and if suppression is attempted under cognitive load
(Wegner et al., 2004; Taylor and Bryant, 2007; Bryant et al.,
2011). Although these studies on a “dream rebound” of sup-
pressed thoughts did not assess sleep disturbance, they describe
the mechanisms through which suppression of affect-laden con-
tent may entail a potentially sleep-interrupting rebound of the
same content.
EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES ON THE ROLE OF WORRY IN INSOMNIA
Another strategy that is suggested to be commonly used by
poor sleepers to manage unwanted thoughts at bedtime is worry
(Borkovec, 1982; Watts et al., 1994). Research accumulated over
several decades has shown that experimental manipulations
designed to increase worry in good sleepers lengthen sleep-onset
latency (Gross and Borkovec, 1982; Hall et al., 1996), whereas
experimental manipulations designed to decrease worry in insom-
nia patients shorten sleep-onset latency (Haynes et al., 1981; Levey
et al., 1991). An innovative set of investigations has been published
more recently that conﬁrms and extends these ﬁndings.
In one study, the approach to presleep worries was experimen-
tally manipulated (Carney and Waters, 2006). Individuals with
insomnia were asked either (a) to produce solutions to worries
(“constructive worry”) in the early evening, or (b) to list their
worries and ﬁll out worry questionnaires. The constructive worry
group reported less cognitive arousal prior to bedtime and spent
less time awake overall. These ﬁndings suggest that structured
problem solving in the evening may reduce presleep cognitive
arousal, thereby facilitating the transition to sleep.
In another recent study designed to test the relationship
between sleeplessness and worry, undergraduate students grouped
into high or low worriers on the basis of their responses on the
Penn State Worry Questionnaire were given either 300mg caf-
feine (to induce sleeplessness) or a placebo prior to sleep (Omvik
et al., 2007). Results indicated that high worriers did not report
increased worry thoughts compared with low worriers in the face
of sleeplessness. However, total sleep time as measured by actig-
raphy was reduced relatively more in high worriers than in low
worriers as a consequence of caffeine-induced sleeplessness. This
result might suggest that worries are comparatively more negative
or intense and therefore more sleep-interfering in high worriers.
Recent research has also begun to explore the relationship
between worry and rumination, which still needs to be clari-
ﬁed. Rumination has been deﬁned as a “mode of responding to
distress that involves repetitively and passively focusing on symp-
toms of distress and on the possible causes and consequences
of these symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Worry and
rumination are generally distinguished on the basis of their tem-
poral orientation: worry refers to distress regarding future events,
whereas rumination concerns thoughts of past events and cur-
rent symptoms (e.g., Kaplan et al., 2009). In the ﬁrst experimental
investigation into the role of rumination for sleep, Guastella and
Moulds (2007) examined the relations between rumination and
sleep quality following a stressful midsemester exam in an under-
graduate sample. Participants were asked either to ruminate about
the exam (“think about how you felt when you were taking the test
today”) or to distract (“think about clouds forming in the sky”)
before sleep. The following morning, participants completed rat-
ings of presleep intrusions about the exam and of sleep quality.
Results indicated that although the rumination instruction led
to more exam intrusions during the presleep period in partici-
pants with high and low trait rumination scores, only individuals
with a trait tendency to ruminate reported reduced sleep quality
following the rumination instruction. According to the authors,
this ﬁnding suggests that soon after the rumination task was
completed, low ruminators returned to their “default” cognitive
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style – that is, non-ruminative thought. In conjunction with cor-
relational evidence that will be reviewed later (Carney et al., 2006,
2010), these results suggest that besides worry, rumination con-
stitutes a form of cognitive control that may contribute to sleep
disturbance.
CORRELATIONAL STUDIES ON THE ROLE OF THOUGHT-CONTROL
STRATEGIES IN INSOMNIA
Apart from suppression, worry, and rumination, people may use a
range of other thought-control strategies in an attempt to manage
unwanted thoughts when trying to fall asleep. With the aim of
exploring such strategies, Harvey (2001) adapted the Thought-
Control Questionnaire (TCQ), designed by Wells and Davies
(1994), for use with patients with insomnia. This questionnaire,
the TCQ-Insomnia (TCQ-I), was administered to 30 individu-
als with insomnia and to 30 good sleepers (Harvey, 2001). The
results indicated that thought suppression, reappraisal and worry
were used signiﬁcantly more by participants with insomnia than
by good sleepers. The use of suppression and worry is consistent
with the experimental evidence discussed earlier. Regarding reap-
praisal, it may be an effective daytime strategy ensuring effective
resolution of hassles and concerns, but itmakes intuitive sense that
engaging in similar processes at night might interfere with sleep
onset.
In a follow-up study, a reﬁned version of the TCQ-I was
elaborated, which was termed the Thought-Control Question-
naire Insomnia-Revised (TCQI-R; Ree et al., 2005). The TCQI-R
comprises six subscales: (1) aggressive suppression (e.g., “I get
angry at myself for having the thought”); (2) cognitive distrac-
tion/suppression (e.g., “I think pleasant thoughts instead”); (3)
behavioral distraction/suppression (e.g., “I try to block them out
by reading, watching TV, or listening to the radio”); (4) social
avoidance (e.g., “I avoid discussing the thought”); (5) worry (e.g.,
“Iworry aboutmoreminor things”); and (6) reappraisal (e.g.,“I try
to reinterpret the thought”). A comparison between good sleep-
ers and individuals with insomnia revealed that the latter more
frequently used every thought-control strategy except for cog-
nitive distraction. In accordance with the experimental evidence
reviewed earlier, the strategies of aggressive suppression and worry
proved particularly unhelpful, with the use of these techniques
predicting poorer sleep quality in a sample that included good
sleepers, subthreshold insomniacs, and insomniacs. In contrast,
the use of cognitive distraction predicted better sleep quality. The
validation study of the French version of the TCQI-R essentially
replicated these ﬁndings (Schmidt et al., 2009): all six thought-
control strategies were signiﬁcantly related to facets of insomnia,
with worry and aggressive suppression being most strongly related
to insomnia symptoms and cognitive distraction functioning as a
potential buffer against the latter.
In a recent extension of this line of research, a study with a
large sample of young adults has revealed how certain personality
traits may predispose people to rely on dysfunctional strategies
of mental control when confronted with thoughts that keep them
awake at night (Schmidt et al.,2010). Speciﬁcally,a structural equa-
tion model analysis indicated that individuals scoring high on two
facets of impulsivity, namely, urgency and lack of perseverance,
are particularly prone to respond with aggressive suppression and
worry to unwantedmental activity at night. Impulsive urgency can
be deﬁned as the tendency to act rashly, especially under condi-
tions of negative affect (Whiteside and Lynam, 2001). This facet
has been shown to reﬂect a relative inability to deliberately inhibit
dominant, automatic, or prepotent responses (Gay et al., 2008).
As for lack of perseverance, it refers to an individual’s inability to
remain focused on a task, especially if the latter is boring or difﬁ-
cult (Whiteside and Lynam, 2001). This facet is linked to a relative
inability to inhibit recurrent and irrelevant thoughts or memories
(Gay et al., 2008).
The pathways through which the two mentioned facets of
impulsivity may lead to an increase of unwanted cognitive activ-
ity at bedtime and thereby to a more intense use of dysfunctional
control are twofold. Impulsive behavior may lead to a buildup of
cognitive and affective arousal in the course of the day, which will
then interfere with sleep and evoke more intense efforts at men-
tal control. Additionally, or alternatively, problems with cognitive
inhibition, as involved in lack of perseverance, may render indi-
viduals particularly vulnerable to unwanted intrusive thoughts at
bedtime, and problems with behavioral inhibition, as involved in
urgency, may prompt individuals to immediately do something
about the unwanted thoughts, be it by way of mental or real-life
responses. Below, we will review evidence for the ﬁrst pathway,
which suggests that impulsive urgency is indeed related to a surge
of negative thoughts and emotions at bedtime (e.g., feelings of
regret) that hinder the process of falling asleep (e.g., Schmidt
and Van der Linden, 2009). The question of whether urgency and
lack of perseverance also act on sleep-interfering mental activity
through the second pathway remains to be explored.
Another important question awaiting further research is that
of how dysfunctional thought-control may contribute to the tran-
sition from acute to chronic insomnia. In a pioneering study
in this ﬁeld, Jansson and Linton (2006) examined the associa-
tions between worry and poor sleep in relatively new (poor sleep
3–7months) and chronic (poor sleep 8–12months) insomnia suf-
ferers. The main ﬁnding was that worry about sleeplessness was
associated with poorer perceived sleep in individuals with chronic,
but not recent, insomnia. The authors interpreted this ﬁnding
as suggesting that the impact of sleep-related worry becomes
increasingly stronger over time, which supports the idea that
worry contributes to the maintenance of sleep problems and the
development of chronic insomnia.
STUDIES ON THE ROLE OF IMAGERY CONTROL IN INSOMNIA
In parallel to the studies on thought control in insomnia, a liter-
ature has emerged that focuses on the control of imagery, that
is, the ability to manage the occurrence of mental images. As
described in the introduction, unwanted intrusive thoughts at
bedtime can take the form of verbal thought or visual imagery.
Borkovec et al. (1998) proposed that thinking about an emotional
topic in verbal mode results in a drop in physiological response,
which hinders in-depth processing and resolution of the emo-
tional topic. Conversely, the translation of a concern into an image
is suggested to increase physiological response in the short term,
but will ultimately facilitate successful processing and the resolu-
tion of the emotion (Borkovec et al., 1998; Sibrava and Borkovec,
2006). Application of this theorizing to insomnia leads to the
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hypothesis that because presleep worry includes “the presence of
active, picture-like images” (Coates et al., 1982), perhaps patients
with insomnia spontaneously disengage from images to think
about the same topic in verbal thought, thereby preventing emo-
tional processing and contributing to the fueling of intrusive and
worrisome thought (Harvey, 2002). Two published investigations
have tested this proposal.
First, in an investigation of the imagery experienced during
the presleep period in the natural home environment, 20 patients
with insomnia and 20 good sleepers recorded when an image came
to their mind by pressing a handheld counter (Nelson and Har-
vey, 2003). They then provided an oral description of the image
and indicated whether the image was “pleasant,” “unpleasant,” or
“neutral.”This information was recorded on a voice-activated tape
recorder. Analyses revealed that the insomnia group experienced
more negatively valenced presleep images, but a lower number
of images overall, relative to the good sleeper group. As negative
imagery is likely to be associated with physiological and affective
activation (Vrana et al., 1986), perhaps this activation motivates
the quick and reﬂexive termination of images (hence the lower
number of images overall reported by the insomnia group) in
order to switch thought to the verbal mode.
Taking this line of investigation a step further, in an experimen-
tal manipulation of imagery control, individuals with insomnia
were exposed to a stressor (speech threat) just prior to getting
into bed and were instructed to think about the speech and its
implications in either images (Image Group, N = 14) or verbal
thought (VerbalGroup,N = 17;Nelson andHarvey,2002).Results
indicated that in the short term, the Image Group reported more
distress and arousal relative to theVerbalGroup. In the longer term,
the Image Group estimated that they fell asleep more quickly and,
the following morning, reported less anxiety and more comfort
about giving the speech compared with the Verbal Group. These
ﬁndings are consistentwithBorkovec et al.’s (1998) suggestion that
the translation of negative-affect-laden concerns into imagery will
ultimately facilitate emotional processing.
However, imagery may also be used in ways that divert atten-
tion from the processing of negative-affect-laden concerns and
may in this way reduce unwanted presleep cognitive activity. In
an experiment designed to test these assumptions (Harvey and
Payne, 2002), individuals with insomnia were given one of three
instructional sets to follow prior to sleep: instructions to distract
using imagery, general instructions to distract, or no instructions.
In the imagery distraction condition, participants were asked to
distract themselves “by imagining a situation they found inter-
esting and engaging, but also pleasant and relaxing.” In support
of the earlier mentioned assumptions, the imagery distraction
group (a) reported shorter sleep-onset latency compared with
the no instruction group and (b) rated their presleep thoughts,
worries, and concerns as less uncomfortable and distressing than
did the two other groups. Regarding the durability of this effect,
the authors of the study note that although imagery distraction
may be an effective short-term method to manage unwanted
thoughts at bedtime, it may be less effective in the longer term
because any “interesting and engaging” content will lose some
of its attraction over time and will have to be replaced by new
content.
In sum, the available evidence on imagery control and insomnia
suggests that individuals with insomnia (a) may avoid negatively
valenced imagery, which will hinder emotional processing and
may thereby fuel negative cognitive activity at bedtime; and (b)
may engage in positively valenced imagery to buffer negatively
toned cognitive activity at bedtime, which may facilitate sleep in
the short, but not long, term,unless the content of positive imagery
is regularly renewed.
AFFECTIVE TURN IN INSOMNIA RESEARCH
As reviewed in the introduction, cognitive approaches to insom-
nia have led to the view that excessive mental activity at bedtime
represents a central impediment to the process of falling asleep
(e.g., Harvey, 2002). Although sleep-interfering mental activity
is likely embedded in affective states, the latter have long received
very little scientiﬁc attention. Recently, however, the importance of
investigating affective processes in insomnia has been recognized
(Harvey et al., 2009; Walker and Harvey, 2010) and a corre-
sponding research agenda has been formulated (Baglioni et al.,
2010a).
STUDIES ON THE ROLE OF AFFECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND CONTROL IN
INSOMNIA
Initial empirical evidence for the role of emotion regulation came
from two studies that investigated stress coping in good sleepers
and insomniacs (Morin et al., 2003; LeBlanc et al., 2007). In both
studies, stress coping skills were assessed with an inventory that
distinguishes between three strategies, namely, task-oriented cop-
ing (e.g., coming upwith several different solutions for a problem),
emotion-oriented coping (e.g., blaming oneself for not knowing
what to do), and avoidance-oriented coping (e.g., watching TV
in order to distract oneself). Critically, it was found that patients
with insomnia reliedmore often on emotion-oriented coping than
good sleepers did, and that emotional coping increased perceived
stress impact and presleep cognitive arousal, thereby contributing
to sleep disturbance.
A number of other pioneering studies have in recent years
investigated how speciﬁc affective states can impact sleep and
how different control strategies may modify these affective states
and their impact on sleep. In an extension of a line of research
suggesting a negative impact of trait anger on sleep (Brissette
and Cohen, 2002; Shin et al., 2005; Granö et al., 2008), Stoia-
Caraballo et al. (2008) examined the relations between forgiveness
of interpersonal transgressions, anger rumination, and sleep qual-
ity in a sample of undergraduates by means of questionnaires.
Using structural equation modeling, the authors found that for-
giveness attenuated anger rumination and negative affect, thereby
enhancing sleep quality.
Just as forgiving others seems to beneﬁt sleep, forgiving oneself
for one’s own “wrongdoings” may also improve sleep, as a line of
research on counterfactual emotions and sleep disturbance sug-
gests. Such emotions include regret, shame, and guilt, which are
termed counterfactual because they involve comparing the facts of
one’s own behavior with counterfactual imaginations of what one
might or should have done (e.g., “If I had [not] done X, I would
be in a better situation now”; e.g., Zeelenberg and Pieters, 2007).
Initial hints at a negative impact of counterfactual emotions on
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sleep came from a questionnaire study by Wrosch et al. (2005),
who found that regret intensity was associated with an omnibus
measure of health problems, including chronic sleep problems, in
a sample of older adults.
More recently, a series of studies have tested the idea that the
time window prior to sleep might be particularly suitable for the
emergence of counterfactual thoughts and emotions because bed-
time is often the ﬁrst quiet period available to review the day’s
events and one’s own behavior. The results of an exploratory ques-
tionnaire study with undergraduate students lent initial support
to this idea: counterfactual thoughts and emotions were often
experienced at bedtime and their frequency was linked to self-
reported insomnia severity (Schmidt and Van der Linden, 2009).
Moreover, it was found that rash-action-prone students (with high
scores on impulsive urgency) were particularly likely to engage in
counterfactual processing at bedtime.
The ﬁndings obtained in the undergraduate sample (Schmidt
andVan der Linden, 2009) were replicated and extended in a ques-
tionnaire study with elderly people (Schmidt et al., in press). In
this study, participants were explicitly asked to indicate when in
the course of the day they most often experienced regrets. The pat-
tern of their responses clearly supported the idea that the presleep
period is particularly suitable for the emergence of counterfac-
tual emotions: while regret frequency remained at relatively low
levels for most of the waking hours, a sharp rise occurred in the
evening after going to bed. Moreover, analyses revealed that the
nocturnal rise of regrets substantially contributed to insomnia
severity independently of other well-known risk factors for late-
life sleep disturbance, such as depression, sleep-interferingmedical
conditions, or medications. Finally, as with young adults, rash-
action-prone older adults were particularly likely to experience
regrets at bedtime and were therefore at a higher risk for sleep
disturbances.
In the study with older adults (Schmidt et al., in press), partic-
ipants were also asked to rate how often they relied on different
thought-control strategies when trying to copewith their regrets at
bedtime. It was found that the thought-control strategies of self-
attacking (e.g., “I blame myself for having the regret”), thought
suppression (e.g., “I try to stop thinking about the regret”), and
worry (e.g., “Instead of the regret, I worry about more minor
things”) were positively associatedwith the frequency of nocturnal
regrets and insomnia severity. These ﬁndings suggest that cognitive
control may be exerted with the aim to achieve affective control,
even if, as in the present study, the cognitive strategies turn out to
be counterproductive.
Further evidence for sleep-interfering effects of counterfac-
tual emotions has recently come from an experimental study by
Schmidt andVan der Linden (in preparation). These authors asked
a sample of undergraduate students to complete two question-
naires at home, one in the evening before going to bed, the other
one in the morning after getting up. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of three groups: prior to sleep, they were asked to
describe the behavior they were most proud of, their most intense
regret,or a standardworkingday (control condition). In themorn-
ing, they rated different dimensions of their sleep. In accordance
with the earlier mentioned ﬁndings on counterfactual emotions
and sleep (Schmidt and Van der Linden, 2009; Schmidt et al., in
press), activation of preexisting regrets almost doubled the time
taken to fall asleep in participants with high levels of habitual
regrets when compared with the control condition.
With regard to the control of counterfactual emotions prior to
sleep, the ﬁnding that self-attacking was closely associated with
the frequency of nocturnal regrets and insomnia severity in the
study by Schmidt et al. (in press) suggests that fostering self-
forgiveness might also be beneﬁcial for sleep, given that forgiving
others for their wrongdoings has been shown to be beneﬁcial for
sleep quality (Stoia-Caraballo et al., 2008). Outside of the area of
insomnia research, converging lines of evidence indicate that train-
ing in self-compassion or self-forgiveness may help down-regulate
negative affective states that excessive self-criticism evokes (e.g.,
Ingersoll-Dayton and Krause, 2005; Gilbert and Procter, 2006).
An investigation by Wrosch et al. (2007, Study 2) provided pre-
liminary evidence that regrets are amenable to intervention and
that sleeping difﬁculties can in this way be reduced. In this study,
participantswere asked to report theirmost severe life regret and to
assess its intensity twice with an interval of 3months. At the same
two time points, participants also rated their overall sleep quality
during the past month. In the interim, they completed a writing
intervention on three consecutive days. Participants in the exper-
imental group were induced to engage in three regret–regulation
strategies that have previously been shown to potentially serve a
protective function: external attribution, downward social com-
parison, and disengagement from undoing the regret through
selection of meaningful future goals (e.g.,Heckhausen et al., 2010).
Participants in the control group were instructed to write in a
neutral, unemotional way about daily events and activities. Con-
sistent with predictions, the authors found a general decline in
regret intensity in the experimental group. Although the writing
intervention did not show a main effect on changes in sleep prob-
lems, therewas a signiﬁcant interactionwith initial regret intensity:
participants in the experimental group who experienced high lev-
els of regret intensity at the beginning of the study experienced
fewer sleep problems over time, whereas the reverse was true of
the participants in the control group.
Besides down-regulation of negative affective states, researchers
have also begun to explore up-regulation of positive affective states
for its effects on sleep. For instance, Steptoe et al. (2008) found in
a large sample of civil servants that both hedonic well-being (pos-
itive affect), as captured by ecological momentary assessment, and
eudaimonic well-being (purposeful engagement with life) were
inversely related to sleep problems after adjustment for age, gen-
der, household income, and self-rated health.Of note,hedonic and
eudaimonic well-being dampened adverse effects of a number of
negative psychosocial factors on sleep, including ﬁnancial strain,
social isolation, low emotional support, negative social interac-
tions, and psychological distress. However, as the authors of the
study emphasize, the relations between sleep and affect are likely
bidirectional and the cross-sectional design of their investigation
did not allow them to draw causal inferences.
Two groups of researchers have investigated how trait and state
gratitude may inﬂuence affect and sleep, complementary to these
ﬁndings onwell-being and sleep. Emmons andMcCullough (2003,
Study 3) asked a sample of people with neuromuscular disease to
complete “daily experience rating forms” in the early evening for
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3weeks. In these forms, participants rated, among other variables,
their daily affect, subjective well-being, and sleep. Unbeknownst
to the participants, they were assigned to one of two experimental
conditions. In the control condition, they simply completed the
mentioned forms. In the gratitude condition, they were asked to
count their blessings, that is, to write down up to ﬁve things that
they were grateful or thankful for. Analyses revealed that the grat-
itude induction increased positive affect, reduced negative affect,
and improved sleep quantity and quality. Pursuing this line of
research, Wood et al. (2009) examined the relations between trait
gratitude and sleep in a cross-sectional questionnaire study with
a large community sample. The authors found that trait grati-
tudepredicted greater subjective sleepquantity andquality, shorter
sleep latency, and less daytime dysfunction. Moreover, the relation
between gratitude and each of the sleep variables was mediated by
more positive and fewer negative presleep cognitions.
Although these studies seem to clearly suggest that up-
regulation of positive affect is beneﬁcial for sleep, some recent
ﬁndings caution against too simplistic a view that would equate
positive affect with good sleep and negative affect with bad sleep.
For instance, Talbot et al. (2009) examined the effects of mood
induction on sleep in a group of individuals with interepisode
bipolar disorder and in a group of healthy controls. Participants
spent two baseline nights in the sleep laboratory, followed by a
happy mood induction night and a sad mood induction night.
Results indicated a signiﬁcant interaction whereby on the happy
mood induction night, the bipolar group exhibited signiﬁcantly
longer sleep-onset latency than did the control group, whereas
there was no difference on the baseline nights. Moreover, the
bipolar group exhibited a (non-signiﬁcantly) longer sleep-onset
latency on the happy mood induction night compared with the
baseline night, whereas the control group exhibited signiﬁcantly
shorter sleep-onset latency on the happy mood induction night.
On the sad mood induction night, participants in both groups had
shorter sleep-onset latency. These ﬁndings suggest that problems
with the regulation of positive affect may contribute to sleep-onset
insomnia in bipolar individuals, possibly because these individu-
als reacted to the happy mood induction with an activating focus
on the pursuit of goals and rewards (cf. Johnson, 2005).
STUDIES ON THE ROLE OF SLEEP FOR AFFECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND
CONTROL
Up to this point, we have considered how dysfunctions in affec-
tive control may adversely impact sleep. In addition, accumulating
evidence suggests that lack of sleep, in turn, may adversely impact
next-day affect. Thus, the relations between sleep and affect are
best conceptualized as bidirectional (Walker and Harvey, 2010),
with the potential of negative effects escalating into a vicious cir-
cle. For instance, Buysse et al. (2007) used ecological momentary
assessment to obtain ratings of daytime symptoms from insomnia
patients. Results indicated that, when compared with good sleep-
ers, individuals with insomnia endorsed higher negative mood
and lower positive mood. More recently, Baglioni et al. (2010b)
presented blocks of neutral, negative, positive, sleep-related neg-
ative, and sleep-related positive pictures to individuals with pri-
mary insomnia and good sleepers. During the presentation, facial
electro-myography and -cardiography were performed. Analyses
revealed that individuals with primary insomnia exhibited greater
inhibition of the corrugator activity in response to sleep-related
positive stimuli as compared with the other blocks of stimuli,
suggesting a heightened motivation and sensitivity toward good
sleep. At the same time, individuals with insomnia rated sleep-
related negative stimuli as more unpleasant and arousing and
showed higher cardiac vagal tone in response to all stimuli as com-
paredwith good sleepers, suggesting subjective hyperarousal in the
context of poor sleep and a general physiological hyperarousal.
Furthermore, converging lines of clinical evidence suggest that
sleeping difﬁculties adversely impact affective disorders (includ-
ing anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder) and problems with
anger, aggression, and impulse control, especially among chil-
dren and adolescents (e.g., Jenni and Dahl, 2008). For example,
in patients with bipolar disorder, the most common prodrome
of mania is sleep disturbance (Jackson et al., 2003). And with
regard to sleep and aggression, Haynes et al. (2006), for instance,
examined the effects of a 6-week behavioral sleep intervention in
adolescents who had recently been treated for substance abuse.
It was found that increases in sleep time were associated with
decreases in aggressive ideation and aggressive actions occurring
during conﬂicts. Taken together, the available clinical evidence
thus clearly suggests that poor sleep impairs affective and behav-
ioral control – and that these effects may be reversed through
sleep-promoting interventions.
Additional evidence for effects of sleep onnext-day affect comes
from sleep-deprivation studies. However, these studies must be
interpreted with the caveat that ﬁndings from sleep-deprived nor-
mal sleepers may not readily be extrapolated to chronic poor
sleepers because, among other reasons, insomnia involves adap-
tation processes and is not necessarily associated with reduced
sleep quantity. In a recent sleep-deprivation study, Talbot et al.
(2010) investigated the impact of experimentally shortened sleep
in adolescents and adults. The main ﬁndings were that sleep-
deprivation reduced positive affect and increased anxiety during
a “catastrophizing task,” in which an interviewer repeatedly asked
questions about each participant’s most threatening worry (for
details, see Vasey and Borkovec, 1992). Analogous results have
been reported for work-related sleep deprivation. For example,
Zohar et al. (2005) investigated the longitudinal relations between
night-shift-related sleep loss and emotional reactivity in medical
residents. Analyses of ecological momentary assessment and acti-
graphic sleep data indicated that sleep loss intensiﬁed negative
emotions following goal-disruptive daytime events, whereas pos-
itive emotions were attenuated following goal-conducive daytime
events. Increased reactivity to negative stimuli following sleep
deprivation has also been found in an experimental study with
healthy young adults (Franzen et al., 2009): when compared with
a normal sleep control group, the sleep-deprived group displayed
a larger pupil diameter when viewing negative pictures.
In the ﬁrst study that used functional brain imaging to investi-
gate the neural underpinnings of affective dysregulation following
sleep loss (Yoo et al., 2007), sleep-deprived individuals showed a
60% increase of amygdala activation in response to increasingly
negative stimuli from the International Affective Picture System, a
threefold increase in the extent of amygdala volume that was acti-
vated, and a loss of functional connectivity between the amygdala
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition December 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 349 | 6
Schmidt et al. Cognitive and affective control in insomnia
and the medial-prefrontal cortex. This brain region exerts top-
down control on the limbic area (including the amygdala) and
regulates emotional responses to render them appropriate for the
context. The study thus suggests that sufﬁcient sleep is indispens-
able formaintaining prefrontal control over affective reactions and
behavior (see also Walker and van der Helm, 2009).
TOWARD AN INTEGRATIVE VIEW OF COGNITIVE AND
AFFECTIVE CONTROL IN INSOMNIA
As argued throughout this article, the stream of consciousness in
the transition to sleep may be decomposed into cognitive aspects,
such as thoughts and images, and affective aspects, suchmoods and
emotions. Recent accounts of insomnia have proposed that both
cognitive and affective aspects of mental hyperactivity at bedtime
may contribute to sleeping difﬁculties (e.g., Espie, 2002; Harvey,
2002). However, as may be gathered from the preceding review
of the literature, research has as yet mainly focused on cognitive
aspects of sleep-interfering mental activity and only just begun
to empirically explore affective aspects. In what follows, we will
describe how an integrative view of cognitive and affective con-
trol in the transition to sleep could advance our understanding
of insomnia and lead to the development of new prevention and
intervention techniques.
NEW INSIGHTS FROM THE REPETITIVE-THOUGHT LITERATURE
Regarding cognitive control in insomnia, converging lines of cor-
relational and experimental evidence suggest that two forms of
thought control that are often used by poor sleepers are par-
ticularly dysfunctional, namely, thought suppression and worry.
However, a question calling for conceptual and empirical clari-
ﬁcation is that of the relation between worry and rumination.
Rumination has also been found to be associated with poor sleep
(Carney et al., 2006; Guastella and Moulds, 2007), and one recent
study has suggested that rumination may in important ways con-
tribute to clinical insomnia independently of worry and depressed
mood states (Carney et al., 2010). In a similar vein, an earlier ques-
tionnaire study with students had revealed that rumination was
associated with subjective sleep quality even after controlling for
negative mood (Thomsen et al., 2003). Of importance, these ﬁnd-
ings suggest that problems with cognitive control may contribute
to sleep problems independently of negative mood states.
To clarify the relation between worry and rumination in the
context of insomnia, some researchers have suggested conceptual-
izing them as two forms of repetitive thought (e.g., Carney et al.,
2010). Repetitive thought has come to be seen as an important
perpetuating factor that pervades a wide range of psychological
disorders (e.g.,Harvey et al., 2004).Outside of the area of insomnia
research, several researchers have in recent times proposed com-
prehensive approaches to repetitive thought that encompass worry
and rumination (e.g., Segerstrom et al., 2003; Watkins, 2008). Of
note, these approaches assume that repetitive thought is not nec-
essarily unconstructive: depending on its characteristics, it may
take constructive forms, such as planning and problem solving.
This assumption accords with the earlier reviewed evidence that
structured problem solving in the evening may reduce presleep
cognitive arousal, thereby facilitating sleep (Carney and Waters,
2006).
According to Watkins (2008), three main features of repetitive
thought account for differential outcomes: (a) the valence of the
thought content, (b) the intrapersonal and situational context in
which repetitive thought occurs, and (c) the level of construal
(abstract vs. concrete processing). As to valence, a majority of
studies have, unsurprisingly, found that repetitive thought ampli-
ﬁes negatively valenced content, thereby leading to unconstructive
outcomes. However, as Watkins (2008) pointed out, positive con-
tent, when excessively repeated, may also lead to unconstructive
outcomes, for example, in individuals vulnerable to hypomania
and mania. This consideration is of particular importance in the
context of insomnia because, as reviewed earlier, positive mood
may contribute to sleep-onset insomnia, at least in certain clini-
cal conditions, such as bipolar disorder (Talbot et al., 2009). For
the “embeddedness” of repetitive thought, both the intrapersonal
and the situational context can range from negatively valenced
(e.g., intrapersonal: dysphoric mood, negative expectations, low
self-esteem; situational: stressful, traumatic events) to positively
valenced (intrapersonal: positive mood, positive expectations,
high self-esteem; situational: successful, rewarding events). The
available empirical evidence suggests that the prevailing valence
of an individual’s cognitive–affective system largely determines
whether repetitive thought is helpful or unhelpful (Watkins, 2008).
For instance, lackof self-esteemand self-criticismhavebeen shown
to moderate the effect of rumination on mood and cognition
(e.g., Robinson and Alloy, 2003) – ﬁndings that are of direct rel-
evance for insomnia because, as reported earlier, self-criticism
and self-attacking have been associated with disturbed sleep in
a number of studies (e.g., Ree et al., 2005; Schmidt et al., 2009;
Vincent et al., 2009).
Although valence, as mentioned earlier, is a major factor in
determining the consequences of repetitive thought, it cannot
explain all empirical ﬁndings. For instance, repetitive thought
focused on negative content has been found to have construc-
tive consequences in some studies of depressive rumination and
of defensive pessimism. Moreover, simply focusing on positive
content is not necessarily the most constructive form of repetitive
thought, as revealed by research on process and outcome sim-
ulations (Watkins, 2008). To account for the available evidence,
Watkins (2008) therefore proposed level of construal as a thirdmain
characteristic of repetitive thought and hypothesized that, at least
when repetitive thought is focused on negative content, low-level,
more concrete construals have more constructive consequences
than do high-level, more abstract construals (see also Watkins,
2011). Regarding the mechanisms by which level of construal
may inﬂuence the consequences of repetitive thinking, Watkins
(2008) mentions that lower level construals should provide more
elaborated and contextual detail about means, alternatives, and
actions, thereby promoting problem solving in difﬁcult, novel, or
complex situations. Moreover, concrete construals may facilitate
self-regulation by focusing attention on the immediate demands,
reducing anxiety, and requiring less effort and thus consuming
fewer resources. Finally, in negative situations, more abstract con-
struals could provoke negative overgeneralizations in the sense
that a single failure is interpreted in terms of individual inade-
quacy (e.g., “I am a failure”) rather than in terms of situational
difﬁculties (e.g., “I failed this hard exam”). Indirect evidence for
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the relevance of level of construal for sleep-interfering mentation
has recently come from studies suggesting that mindfulness-based
cognitive therapy (MBCT), which uses meditation techniques to
train patients away from abstract levels of processing and into
more concrete modes of processing (e.g., Carney and Segal, 2005),
may be beneﬁcial for sleep (e.g., Ong et al., 2008).
In sum, the literature on repetitive thought clearly suggests
that it might be promising to conceptualize presleep worry and
rumination within a larger theoretical framework and to examine
sleep-interfering mental activity along the dimensions of valence,
intrapersonal and situational context, and level of construal. In
particular, such a conceptualization may help elucidate the rela-
tions between thought control, imagery control, and affective
control in the context of insomnia. For instance, worry com-
prises mostly negatively valenced verbal thoughts, rather than
visual images, and is more abstract and less concrete than other
types of mental processing (Sibrava and Borkovec, 2006). The
avoidance of more concrete imagery in worry is postulated to
serve a protective function, whereby physiological activation and
emotional processing are reduced at the expense of maintaining
anxious meanings. A promising avenue for future research will be
todeterminewhether promotingmore concrete levels of construal,
for example, by means of MBCT or exposure therapy, may foster
imagery-related emotional processing inworry, thereby improving
sleep.Another fruitful line of inquirywill be to investigate the links
between suppression and different forms of repetitive thought, as
exempliﬁed in the study by Watkins and Moulds (2009), in the
context of insomnia.
NEW INSIGHTS FROM THE AFFECTIVE SCIENCE LITERATURE
In this section, we will suggest that the theoretical framework for
repetitive thought as elaborated byWatkins (2008) can also serve as
a conceptual platform to investigate affective control in insomnia.
As detailed in the previous section, Watkins’ framework incorpo-
rates affective states in twoways: (a) by taking into account thought
valence and (b) by taking into account subjective affective states
(e.g., negativemood)within the intrapersonal context. However, it
should be underscored that Watkins advocates a clear distinction
between cognitive and affective aspects of repetitive thought at
the conceptual level and recommends the development and use of
repetitive-thought questionnaires that do not confound repetitive
thought with the degree of negative affectivity.
As in the case of repetitive thought, the question naturally
arises as to which dimensions of affective states may impact sleep.
In a ﬁrst empirical attempt to uncover sleep-relevant dimen-
sions of affective states, Stewart et al. (2011) asked a sample of
students to complete questionnaires assessing depressive symp-
toms, trait anxiety, trait anger, trait positive affect, trait rumi-
nation, and sleep quality. Structural equation modeling analy-
ses revealed that negative affect (the shared variance among
the measures of depression, trait anxiety, and trait anger) was
related to poor sleep, whereas no unique effects were observed
for any of the negative and positive affective factors. Of note
in the present context, the relation between negative affect and
sleep was independent of rumination. The latter ﬁnding sug-
gests that affective factors can inﬂuence sleep in ways that are
separable from the effects of cognitive hyperactivity, thereby
highlighting the added value of an affective science approach to
insomnia.
On the basis of their ﬁndings, Stewart et al. (2011) concluded
that “. . . the shared, not unique, aspects of negative emotional fac-
tors may be key determinants of sleep quality” (p. 609). However,
a limitation of their study resides in the fact that it almost exclu-
sively used trait measures. Thus, certain transient affective states
of negative valence, such as regrets (e.g., Schmidt andVan der Lin-
den, in preparation), or of positive valence, such as gratitude (e.g.,
Emmons and McCullough, 2003), may well have unique effects
on sleep. Of note, induction of regrets prior to sleep delayed sleep
onset independently of levels of depressed mood, as assessed by
the Beck Depression Inventory-II (Beck et al., 1996), in the study
by Schmidt and Van der Linden (in preparation). Moreover, pos-
itive affective states may have opposite effects on sleep in normal
and certain clinical populations, such as individuals with bipolar
disorder (e.g., Talbot et al., 2009). In addition, as the study by
Talbot and colleagues also revealed, speciﬁc affective states may
inﬂuence certain sleep parameters but not others (e.g., sleep-onset
latency vs. rapid eye movement density). Clearly, more research
is needed to unravel the associations between the various dimen-
sions of affective states and subjective as well as objective sleep
parameters in normal and clinical populations.
Apart from valence, arousal, which may be further differen-
tiated into bodily excitation and intensity of feeling, is another
fundamental dimension of affective states (e.g., Scherer, 2005).
For instance, intense anger is likely characterized by high bodily
excitation, whereas intense sadness may be accompanied by very
low bodily activation. A better understanding of affective arousal
in the context of insomnia is all the more important as this dimen-
sion may account for ﬁndings suggesting that both positive and
negative affect may impair sleep (e.g., Talbot et al., 2009). Regard-
ing the assessment of presleep arousal, research has as yet mainly
focused on the cognitive and somatic dimensions. For example,
Nicassio et al.’s (1985) Presleep Arousal Scale comprises a cog-
nitive arousal and a somatic arousal subscale; more recently, a
reﬁned instrument to assess presleep cognitive arousal has been
developed (Harvey and Espie, 2004). However, to the best of our
knowledge, no instrument that speciﬁcally captures presleep affec-
tive arousal in its two subdimensions is currently available. Yet,
outside of insomnia research, recent advances in affective sciences
have led to the development of new assessment tools that could
be adapted for investigations of sleep. For example, the Geneva
Emotion Wheel (Scherer, 2005) allows one to rate the valence and
intensity of a wide range of emotions by checking corresponding
circles in a graphical display.
A further complication arises from the fact that, in the area of
insomnia research, the terms “emotion” and “affect” have often
been used interchangeably although the two concepts should
be clearly distinguished. Within the ﬁeld of affective sciences,
emotions are generally considered as one particular type of affec-
tive state that features the following components (e.g., Scherer,
2005): (a) a cognitive component (appraisals); (b) a subjective
feeling component (emotional experience); (c) a neurophysio-
logical component (bodily symptoms); (d) a motor expression
component (vocal, facial, and postural display); and (e) a moti-
vational component (action tendencies). As compared with affect
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dispositions (e.g., hostility) and moods (e.g., depressed mood),
which have often been investigated in connection with sleep, emo-
tions are: (a) typically linked to a stimulus event, (b) of shorter
duration, and (c) of greater intensity. In view of their greater inten-
sity, emotions deserve special scientiﬁc attention in the context of
insomnia. As reviewed earlier, a number of recent investigations
have provided evidence for sleep-interfering effects of speciﬁc
emotions, such as regret, shame, and guilt (e.g., Schmidt and Van
der Linden, 2009; Schmidt et al., in press). Given that emotions
are endowed with speciﬁc action tendencies, emotions might have
unique sleep-interfering effects that are not accounted for by gen-
eral effects of valence or arousal. For instance, anger comprises
action tendencies of opposition or assault (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989),
whereas regret is typically accompanied by such action tendencies
as to “kick oneself” and to correct one’s mistake (e.g., Berndsen
et al., 2004). Obviously, such action tendencies, if experienced
at bedtime, have a strong potential to interfere with the process
of falling asleep, especially in impulsive individuals with action–
inhibition difﬁculties (cf. Schmidt and Van der Linden, 2009).
Exploration of sleep-interfering action tendencies in the context
of affective control might thus be a worthy endeavor.
Analysis of presleep mental activity in terms of these emo-
tion components reveals yet another underinvestigated area in
the context of affective control and insomnia, namely, the effects
of (non-)expression of emotions. In a pioneering study in this
ﬁeld, Caska et al. (2009) found in a large sample of patients with
coronary heart disease that self-rated suppression of anger expres-
sion was substantially associated with poor sleep quality. This
association remained strong even after adjusting for demograph-
ics, comorbidities, lifestyle factors, medications, cardiac function,
depressive symptoms, and trait anger. Apart from cognitive con-
trol strategies, such as thought suppression and worry, behavioral
forms of affect control may thus have an important impact on
sleep, which clearly calls for further investigation.
Also underinvestigated in the context of insomnia is what Gross
and Thompson (2007) termed “antecedent-focused emotion reg-
ulation.” This term refers to anticipatory forms of regulation
that intervene before a full-blown emotional response occurs.
For instance, an individual may selectively approach situations
that are likely to evoke positive emotions or avoid situations that
are liable to provoke negative emotions. To date, most studies
in clinical research have focused on “response-focused emotion
regulation,” that is, retrospective forms of regulation, such as the
cognitive strategies of thought suppression and worry, which are
typically used to deal with emotions once they have occurred.
In the ﬁrst study to investigate the relations between antecedent-
focused emotion regulation and sleep,Schmidt andVander Linden
(2011) hypothesized that individuals who have difﬁculties antic-
ipating potential future regrets are at an increased risk of blindly
running into situations or adopting behaviors that are prone to
evoke regrets. As a consequence, they should experience more
actual regrets and related counterfactual emotions, which have
been shown to interfere with sleep (Schmidt and Van der Linden,
2009; Schmidt et al., in press). To test these ideas, Schmidt andVan
der Linden (2011) developed theRegretAnticipationFailures Scale
and administered it, within a battery of other questionnaires, to
university students. Results supported the predictions mentioned:
regret anticipation failures in the course of the day were associated
with the frequency of regret-related counterfactual thoughts and
emotions at bedtime, and the latter mediated the effect of regret
anticipation failures on self-rated insomnia severity. These prelim-
inary ﬁndings encourage further investigation of the implications
of antecedent-focused emotion regulation for sleep. For instance,
an intriguing question is that of whether training in affect antic-
ipation might help people avoid negative emotional incidents in
the course of the day, thereby obviating the need to engage in
response-focused emotion regulation (e.g., thought suppression,
worry) at the end of the day.
SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
In the ﬁrst part of this article, we reviewed a coherent body of
evidence suggesting that dysfunctional forms of cognitive control,
such as thought suppression,worry, rumination, and imagery con-
trol, are associated with sleep disturbance, as they are with other
formsof psychopathology. In the secondpart of this article,wepre-
sented more recent lines of evidence indicating that dysfunctional
forms of affective control, such as problems with down-regulating
negative and positive affective states, are also related to sleep dis-
turbance, and that sleep disturbance, in turn, can impair next-day
affect control. In the third part of this article, we outlined how
principles from the repetitive-thought literature and the affec-
tive science literature can inspire new lines of investigation and
help develop a theoretical framework that integrates the roles of
cognitive and affective control in insomnia.
An important theoretical question that calls for further research
is that of whether dysfunctional forms of cognitive and affective
control may be viewed as separate, though related, mechanisms,
or may rather stem from a unitary, core mechanism. As reviewed
earlier, some of the available suggests that dysfunctional forms of
cognitive control, such as thought suppression, are often used to
down-regulate negative affective states, for example regrets (e.g.,
Schmidt et al., in press). However, there is also evidence suggest-
ing that cognitive factors and affective factors may independently
impact sleep. For instance, in the previously mentioned study by
Stewart et al. (2011), the relation between negative affect (as cap-
tured by the shared variance among measures of depression, trait
anxiety, and trait anger) and sleepwas independent of rumination.
Conversely, another study has revealed that rumination may in
important ways contribute to clinical insomnia independently of
depressed mood states (Carney et al., 2010). Taken together, these
preliminaryﬁndings suggest that affective factorsmight contribute
to insomnia over and above the inﬂuence of well-established
cognitive factors.
Regardingmethodology, a limitation of the reviewed literatures
on cognitive and affective control in insomnia resides in the fact
that most studies have as yet relied on self-report. However, con-
clusions from these investigations continue to be strengthened and
extended by the use of behavioral measures, including actigraphy
(e.g., Omvik et al., 2007), physiological measures (e.g., Baglioni
et al., 2010b), functional brain imaging (e.g., Yoo et al., 2007),
and clinical intervention studies (e.g., Haynes et al., 2006). Clearly,
more researchwith thesemethods is needed to advance our under-
standing of the interplay between cognitive and affective factors in
insomnia.
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With respect to the treatment of insomnia, the reviewed
literatures contain a number of indications of how the stan-
dard cognitive–behavioral therapy (e.g., Bootzin and Epstein,
2011) could be complemented with interventions that speciﬁcally
address dysfunctional forms of cognitive and affective control. For
instance, training in structured problem solving might counteract
non-constructive forms of repetitive-thought prior to sleep (e.g.,
Carney and Waters, 2006), or training in self-compassion (e.g.,
Gilbert and Procter, 2006) might defuse sleep-interfering effects
of self-attacking (e.g., Schmidt et al., in press). These techniques
exemplify howbasic research into cognitive and affective control in
insomnia may ultimately translate into new forms of intervention.
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